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Annual Review

NCSC Annual Review 2026

Looking back at the National Cyber Security Centre's tenth year and its key developments and highlights, between 1 September 2025 and 31 August 2026.

Page 13 of 29

7 things we learned

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What 337 incidents revealed about cyber resilience in the UK.

  • 1

    Attackers exploit the basics

    • known vulnerabilities
    • poorly secured systems
    • internet-facing assets remain a primary route to compromise
  • 2

    People remain the target

    • social engineering
    • credential theft
    • security culture matters
  • 3

    State and criminal actors share weaknesses

    • similar routes to compromise
    • vulnerability exploitation
    • credential abuse
    • poor cyber hygiene creates opportunities for all threat actors
  • 4

    Ransomware remains highly disruptive

    • extortion
    • data theft
    • operational disruption
    • long recovery timelines
  • 5

    Preparation determines outcomes

    • logging
    • monitoring
    • incident response planning
    • supply chain resilience
  • 6

    Early action reduces impact

    • Early Warning notifications
    • faster detection
    • containment before escalation
    • incidents prevented from requiring NCSC support
  • 7

    Sophisticated actors don't have to be sophisticated to gain access

    • initial access doesn't have to be sophisticated
    • onward activity by the actor is where sophistication becomes evident
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Key takeaway:

Most successful attacks continue to exploit familiar weaknesses. Improving cyber resilience fundamentals remains the most effective way to reduce both the likelihood and impact of cyber incidents.

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