Advisory

Russian FSB cyber actor Star Blizzard continues worldwide spear-phishing campaigns.

Updated and new research, updated vulnerabilities, security updates and revised actors.
Russian FSB cyber actor Star Blizzard continues worldwide spear-phishing campaigns
The Russia-based actor is targeting organisations and individuals in the UK and other geographical areas of interest

Overview

The Russia-based actor Star Blizzard (formerly known as SEABORGIUM, also known as Callisto Group/TA446/COLDRIVER/TAG-53/BlueCharlie) continues to successfully use spear-phishing attacks against targeted organisations and individuals in the UK, and other geographical areas of interest, for information-gathering activity.

The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the US National Security Agency (NSA), the US Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), the Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), and the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ) assess that Star Blizzard is almost certainly subordinate to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Centre 18.

Industry has previously published details of Star Blizzard. This advisory draws on that body of information.
This advisory raises awareness of the spear-phishing techniques Star Blizzard uses to target individuals and organisations. This activity is continuing through 2023.

**Targeting profile**

Since 2019, Star Blizzard has targeted sectors including academia, defence, governmental organisations, NGOs, think tanks and politicians.

Targets in the UK and US appear to have been most affected by Star Blizzard activity, however activity has also been observed against targets in other NATO countries, and countries neighbouring Russia.

During 2022, Star Blizzard activity appeared to expand further, to include defence-industrial targets, as well as US Department of Energy facilities.

**Outline of the attacks**

The activity is typical of spear-phishing campaigns, where an actor targets a specific individual or group using information known to be of interest to the targets. In a spear-phishing campaign, an actor perceives their target to have direct access to information of interest, be an access vector to another target, or both.

**Research and preparation**

Using open-source resources to conduct reconnaissance, including social media and professional networking platforms, Star Blizzard identifies hooks to engage their target. They take the time to research their interests and identify their real-world social or professional contacts. [T1589; T1593]

Star Blizzard creates email accounts impersonating known contacts of their targets to help appear legitimate. They also create fake social media or networking profiles that impersonate respected experts [T1585.001] and have used supposed conference or event invitations as lures.
Star Blizzard uses webmail addresses from different providers, including Outlook, Gmail, Yahoo and Proton mail in their initial approach, impersonating known contacts of the target or well-known names in the target’s field of interest or sector.

To appear authentic, the actor also creates malicious domains resembling legitimate organisations.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) provides a list of observed Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) in their SEABORGIUM blog, but this is not exhaustive.

**Preference for personal email addresses**

Star Blizzard has predominantly sent spear-phishing emails to targets’ personal email addresses, although they have also used targets’ corporate or business email addresses. The actors may intentionally use personal emails to circumvent security controls in place on corporate networks.

**Building a rapport**

Having taken the time to research their targets’ interests and contacts to create a believable approach, Star Blizzard now starts to build trust. They often begin by establishing benign contact on a topic they hope will engage their targets. There is often some correspondence between attacker and target, sometimes over an extended period, as the attacker builds rapport.

**Delivery of malicious link**

Once trust is established, the attacker uses typical phishing tradecraft and shares a link, apparently to a document or website of interest.
This leads the target to an actor-controlled server, prompting the target to enter account credentials.

The malicious link may be a URL in an email message, or the actor may embed a link in a document on OneDrive, Google Drive, or other file-sharing platforms.

Star Blizzard uses the open-source framework EvilGinx in their spear-phishing activity, which allows them to harvest credentials and session cookies to successfully bypass the use of two-factor authentication.

**Exploitation and further activity**

Whichever delivery method is used, once the target clicks on the malicious URL, they are directed to an actor-controlled server that mirrors the sign-in page for a legitimate service. Any credentials entered at this point are now compromised.

Star Blizzard then uses the stolen credentials to log in to a target’s email account, where they are known to access and steal emails and attachments from the victim’s inbox. They have also set up mail-forwarding rules, giving them ongoing visibility of victim correspondence.

The actor has also used their access to a victim email account to access mailing-list data and a victim’s contacts list, which they then use for follow-on targeting. They have also used compromised email accounts for further phishing activity.

**Conclusion**

Spear-phishing is an established technique used by many actors, and Star Blizzard uses it successfully, evolving the technique to maintain their success.
Individuals and organisations from previously targeted sectors should be vigilant of the techniques described in this advisory.

In the UK you can report related suspicious activity to the NCSC

Information on effective defence against spear-phishing is included in the 'Mitigation' section below.

**MITRE ATT&CK®**

This report has been compiled with respect to the MITRE ATT&CK® framework, a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations.

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<td>T1593</td>
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<td>Star Blizzard uses open-source research and social media to identify information about victims to use in targeting.</td>
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<tr>
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Mitigation

A number of mitigations will be useful in defending against the activity described in this advisory.

- **Use strong passwords.** Use a separate password for email accounts and avoid password re-use across multiple services. See NCSC guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/top-tips-for-staying-secure-online/use-a-strong-and-separate-password-for-email

- **Use multi-factor authentication** (2-factor authentication/two-step authentication) to reduce the impact of password compromises. See NCSC guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/multi-factor-authentication-online-services and https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/setting-two-factor-authentication-2fa

- **Protect your devices and networks by keeping them up to date:** use the latest supported versions, apply security updates promptly, use anti-virus and scan regularly to guard against known malware threats. See NCSC guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/mobile-device-guidance/antivirus-and-other-security-software

- **Exercise vigilance.** Spear-phishing emails are tailored to avoid suspicion. You may recognise the sender’s name, but has the email come from an address that you recognise? Would you expect contact from this person’s webmail address rather than their corporate email address? Has the suspicious email come to your personal/webmail address, rather than your corporate one? Can you verify that the email is legitimate via another means? See NCSC guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/phishing and https://www.ic3.gov/Home/IndustryAlerts

- **Enable your email providers’ automated email scanning features.** These are turned on by default for consumer mail providers. See NCSC guidance:
Disable mail-forwarding. Attackers have been observed to set up mail-forwarding rules to maintain visibility of target emails. If you cannot disable mail-forwarding, then monitor settings regularly to ensure that a forwarding rule has not been set up by an external malicious actor.
Disclaimer

This report draws on information derived from NCSC and industry sources. Any NCSC findings and recommendations made have not been provided with the intention of avoiding all risks and following the recommendations will not remove all such risk. Ownership of information risks remains with the relevant system owner at all times.

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